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Abstract 
Though popular opinion in the US is favorable toward vaccination, a growing hesitancy to 
vaccinate children threatens rates of uptake and coverage. In response, researchers now study 
psychological factors thought to influence vaccine-decisions, as having this information might be 
useful in addressing vaccine hesitancy in the clinic and beyond. The present thesis reviews 
evidence from this body of work, and shares results of a new study on the influence of analytic 
and intuitive thinking styles upon endorsement of childhood vaccines. In a national sample (N = 
543), analytic thinking predicted endorsement alone and in the presence of covariates in a 
regression model, while intuitive thinking’s relation to endorsement in the model was 
statistically unclear, and so did not support or refute claims in the literature suggesting this 
association. Implications and limitations of results, as well as possible directions for future 
research are discussed in detail.   
 
Keywords: vaccines, vaccination, vaccine hesitancy, vaccine endorsement, cognitive style, dual 
process model, dual processes, analytic thinking, intuitive thinking, need for cognition, faith in 
intuition  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYTIC THINKING PREDICTS VACCINE ENDORSEMENT  3 
Analytic Thinking Predicts Vaccine Endorsement: 
Linking Cognitive Style and Affective Orientation Toward Childhood Vaccination  
Introduction 
 Though public opinion toward vaccination is positive in the US, and coverage for most 
vaccines recommended by the CDC hovers above 90% (Kahan, 2014; WHO, 2014), hesitancy 
toward vaccination of children is increasing, as are rates of infection with some vaccine-
preventable diseases (Glanz et al., 2013; Gostin, 2015; Omer, Richards, Ward, & Bednarczyk, 
2012; WHO, 2014). In response, researchers now study a multitude of influences upon individual 
and parental vaccine decision-making, including economic, educational, sociocultural, and 
psychological factors, suggesting such knowledge is useful in addressing this issue in the clinic 
and beyond (Boom & Cunningham, 2014; Dubé et al., 2013; Gupta, 2010; C. M. Poland, 
Jacobson, Opel, Marcuse, & Poland, 2014; C. M. Poland & Poland, 2011; Salmon et al., 2005). 
In the present thesis, evidence from the psychological branch of this literature is reviewed and 
results from a new study are shared. The study accessed an online US sample (N = 543), testing 
whether intuitive and analytic thinking styles influence likelihood of endorsement of childhood 
vaccines/vaccination.  
Literature Review and Central Terms 
Hesitancy versus endorsement of childhood vaccination: Definition and explanation 
 General vaccine hesitancy/endorsement has been studied by Kahan (2014), who concludes 
that individual evaluations of childhood vaccine safety are predominantly motivated by emotion. 
Surveying a large national sample (N = 2,316), Kahan found that attitudes toward vaccines in the 
US are predominantly positive, while identifying an emotional, affective orientation toward 
vaccines as the primary factor underlying most individual vaccine risk assessments, as opposed 
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to calculation of objective risks and benefits of vaccination. These results concur with earlier 
research on public vaccine knowledge and attitudes in North America, which has found that 
although most respondents tend to have minimal declarative knowledge on vaccine risk and 
safety, they still tend to endorse vaccines (Ritvo et al., 2003).  
 Kahan draws centrally upon Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor's (2005) paper on the 
role of affect in decision making and risk-judgments. There, it is concluded that in potentially 
risky scenarios, people tend to judge the options that feel right to them as the safest, often 
completely failing to calculate objective odds of risk. Reviewing the literature on reasoning and 
cognitive biases in risk assessments, they conclude that 
 … [o]ne cannot assume that an intelligent person can understand the meaning of and 
properly act on even the simplest of numbers, not to mention more esoteric measures or 
statistics pertaining to risk, unless these numbers are infused with affect. Thus, the forms of 
[quantitative] information that people take for granted as meaningful, and that they expend 
immense effort and expense toward gathering and disseminating, may be illusory. 
 (2015: S39). 
 Central to Kahan’s (2104) evidence is a strong inverse correlation between risk and benefit 
perceptions of childhood vaccines in the sample (r = -.77, p < .001, p. 22). Kahan notes  
 …the best evidence that someone is engaged in … self-conscious and informed 
weighing [of risk/benefit] is the independence of her assessments of a putative risk 
source’s risks and benefits. Highly congruent [i.e., correlated] perceptions of costs and 
benefits, in contrast, imply a gestalt form of judgment driven by an affective appraisal 
(2014: 23).  
That is, since there is so much variation in how safe/dangerous vaccines are, person-to-person 
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and situation-to-situation1, those who weighed vaccine decisions largely on the data would 
probably show a lower correlation between risk and benefit perceptions than those who held a 
unidimensional attitude. Thus, since the Pearson coefficient there is strong, it is inferred that the 
majority of the population more often makes affective, rather than intellect-driven vaccine 
decisions.  
 This is a compelling possibility, and recommends continued research. The present study 
attempted to replicate and move forward with this finding of association between risk and benefit 
perceptions, asking how much, if at all, intellectual rather than affective mental activity might 
actually influence childhood vaccine endorsement, and how (again, if at all) might more intuitive 
people vary in their deployment of affect versus intellect in their vaccine decisions? Intellectual 
versus affective aspects of cognition and personality are explored in the next section. 
Dual process models and cognitive style  
 Most researchers in psychology agree that brains handle the sensory and cognitive 
information of daily life using two discrete information-processing systems. One system is 
analytic, rational, and intentional, the other intuitive, automatic, and affective; (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Evans, 2008, 2012; Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Each of 
these systems go by multiple names in the literature (see Evans & Stanovich, 2013 for a review), 
and are referred to here as mainly as the analytic and intuitive systems, following Epstein (1994, 
1998, 2014). The analytic system is associated with intentional work on effort-demanding tasks, 
like calculation and memorization of terminology, while the intuitive system is basically 
effortless and instinctive: it is defined by perceptions, emotions, and ‘going by the gut’. Most 
moment-to-moment thinking is the work of the intuitive system, but this automaticity can be 
                                                
1 See Jacobson et al. (2001) for a discussion of objective risks associated with vaccines. 
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‘intervened’ upon by the analytical system to focus on harder tasks (Evans, 2008). 
Conceptualization of human thinking in this dichotomous fashion goes back at least to William 
James's discussion on the regulation of ‘passions’ (1890), and today is commonly called dual-
process theory (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Evans, 2008). 
Evidence suggests different people employ and rely on each of these systems to varying 
degrees – some people predictably favor use of the intuitive system, others tend to use the 
rational system more (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; 
Epstein, 1994; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Evans, 2008; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). In personality 
psychology, specifically in Cognitive Experiential Theory, or CET (Epstein, 2014), the terms 
intuitive cognitive style and analytic cognitive style refer to individual persons’ overall 
orientation in this dichotomy – this is ‘how intuitive/analytical they are’ in the day-to-day 
thinking. In CET, this orientation is commonly measured in the person with a one of several 
versions of a psychometric called the Rational/Experiential Inventory, or REI (Epstein et al., 
1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; see Materials section). Though CET conceptualizes interactions 
between the two systems as ongoing throughout day-to-day thought, the analytic and intuitive 
factors of the REI generally do not correlate – thus the two systems can be considered separate, 
though interactive (Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999).  
Through such interactions, the two systems can ‘train’ each other: activities that take 
effort in the beginning become automatic as expertise is gained (Klein, 1999; Sladek, Bond, & 
Phillips, 2010), just as education in analytically vigorous disciplines, like the natural sciences, 
seems to lead to less inclination toward behaviors and beliefs associated with the intuitive 
system2 (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005). Individuals differ in their level of partaking in activities 
                                                
2 Beliefs associated with higher use of the intuitive system are discussed in coming sections. 
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that nurture and train the two systems to varying degrees (for multitudes of reasons), and so 
differences in cognitive style between individuals can be described as mediated by individual’s 
unique circumstances, including and especially environmental/cultural influences (see Buchtel & 
Norenzayan, 2009).  
 Heuristics. Crucially, intuitive people tend more often than analytic people to use 
heuristics and cognitive biases, or ‘quick and dirty’ mental shortcuts in their decision-making, 
such as judging the likelihood of something based on how easily it springs to mind, as opposed 
to considering objective probabilities (Stanovich & West, 1998; West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 
2008; see Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Indeed, use of heuristics is considered a hallmark of 
intuitive thinking, while use of effortful, systematic reasoning is considered the hallmark of the 
analytic system3 (see Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2008; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; 
Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). What makes this point crucial is that Kahan’s 
(2014) conceptualization of vaccine endorsement is heuristic: it is affective rather than 
intellectual. This thesis asks: might then the outcomes of Kahan’s intuitively-rooted 
measurement (that is, vaccine hesitancy/endorsement) be influenced by the general rate at which 
a person employs heuristics in everyday thought – i.e., their general reliance on the intuitive 
system? And what about an overall tendency toward use of the analytic system? Literature 
reviewed below suggests both these associations might exist. 
                                                
3 It must be noted that heuristics are evolutionarily adaptive: just because they often lead to 
objectively inaccurate conclusions does not negate the fact that are the product of natural 
selection, and so for millennia brought primates to accurate enough conclusions to ensure the 
fecundity of hominids (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996). 
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Use of heuristics by the vaccine hesitant. Variation between individuals in their tendency 
toward use of analysis versus heuristics has been argued to influence their vaccine decisions: it is 
suggested in a growing literature that heuristic decision-making might underlie a significant 
amount of vaccine hesitancy (Gupta, 2010; Jacobson, Targonski, & Poland, 2007; Poland et al., 
2014; Poland & Poland, 2011; Poland, Jacobson, & Ovsyannikova, 2009). Indeed, it has been 
suggested that medical professionals should adapt patient/parental-counseling on vaccine safety 
to the fact that people might reason heuristically, rather than simply presenting patients/parents 
with data on vaccine safety and expecting them to act as rational agents – which is purportedly 
common practice in clinical settings (Gupta, 2010; Poland & Poland, 2011). In light of this 
suggestion, Poland and others (2014) offer a detailed list of heuristics and biases known to 
cognitive scientists, and which might influence the decision making of vaccine-hesitant 
individuals and parents. Several are reviewed below, with both quoted and paraphrased 
explanations, along with the citation of the original research on the specific heuristic/bias: 
(1) The confirmation bias, or the tendency to seek confirmatory evidence while discounting 
contradictory evidence (see Nickerson, 1998 in Poland, et al., 2014) seems at work, for 
instance, in individuals’ acceptance “…as evidence of cause and effect reports of a child 
being diagnosed with autism in near proximity to receipt of [the] MMR vaccine” (p. 346) – 
thus confirming for them this widespread belief (see Poland & Jacobson, 2012), even after 
being presented with scientific evidence by medical researchers that contradicts this belief’s 
soundness. 
(2) The representativeness heuristic, or judging the likelihood of an event considering its 
superficial resemblance to other events (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974 in Poland, et. al, 
2014) might underlie individuals’ associating maladies and vaccination. A person might 
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consider such a link valid to the extent that such situations resemble rumored and/or real-life 
incidents of vaccine contamination and/or adverse effects of vaccines on some individuals 
(see also Jacobson et al., 2001 for exploration of documented adverse effects of vaccines).  
(3) The omission/commission bias, or the tendency to perceive possible adverse effects of 
inaction as preferable to possible adverse effects of action, irrespective of the objective risks 
of each option, might be at work in the person’s perception of disease contraction as 
preferable to a presumed side effect of a vaccine (see Asch et al., 1994 in Poland et al., 2014; 
Meszaros et al., 1996). 
(4);(5) Belief perseverance, or the tendency to hold beliefs even after being confronted with 
contradictory data (see Nestler, 2010 in Poland, et al., 2014), as well as risk compression, or 
a tendency to overestimate the prevalence of statistically rare risks (see Fischhoff, 1993 in 
Poland, et. al, 2014) are each tautologically present in many persons’ decision to reject 
vaccines. 
 (6) Attributional frameworks, or the construction of compelling causal explanations for 
events (which are highly memorable) – despite incongruences in the inference of causality 
given what data actually show (see Nestler, 2010 in Poland, et al., 2014)  – seems present in 
the emotionally compelling personal memories people often reference as causal to a decision 
to not vaccinate. 
(7) Avoidance of ambiguity, or the tendency to consider a known risk as less risky than an 
ambiguous one (see Baron, 2000 in Poland, et. al, 2014) is purportedly seen in a person’s 
perception of infection with diseases as being less risky than whatever possible side effects of 
vaccines. 
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Poland & Poland (2011) also offer a related taxonomy of common patterns in reasoning 
they associate with lower vaccine endorsement, which includes (a) “denialist” thinking styles 
associated with disregard of scientific fact and acceptance of the information presented in 
conspiracy theories; (b) fear-based thinking styles motivated by subjective feelings of fear 
regarding vaccines; (c) “right-brained” (emotional) thinking styles which fail to grasp what 
statistical figures reflecting vaccine risks actually mean, and (d) “heuristic” thinking, or the 
reliance on mental shortcuts like those already outlined above. With regard to the present thesis, 
note that these thinking styles indicate reliance on intuition: fear-response-instincts, ‘right 
brained-ness’ (emotional thinking style), and of course heuristics are all prototypically intuitive 
mental features (Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2008; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). As for the “denialist” 
reasoning (i.e., reasoning focused on conspiracy theories), this will be approached in a coming 
section.   
Finally, Jacobson et al. (2007) also offer a taxonomy of reasoning flaws observed among 
those who reject vaccines, which they derive from Gilovich's (1991) critique of reasoning flaws 
in modern society. There, vaccine hesitant individuals are noted as showing high rates of seeking 
and “…find[ing] order and predictability in random data” (Jacobson et al., 2007: 3147) where 
they expect it (for instance, seeing danger in vaccination where it does not exist according to the 
data), and “difficulty in detecting and correcting biases in incomplete and unrepresentative 
data… [along with] …eagerness to interpret ambiguous and inconsistent data to fit theories and 
expectations” (p. 3147). The thinking habits noted in Jacobson, et al. seem, like the preceding 
examples, rooted in a favoring-of and/or failure-to-work-against the intuitive system when 
making decisions under uncertainty/the reliance on heuristics rather than data.  
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These papers seem to suggest lower (i.e. negative) orientation toward vaccines, or 
hesitancy rather than endorsement, might be observed among more intuitive individuals, as they 
are the ones (theoretically) more prone to use heuristics, and use of heuristics is associated with 
hesitancy. However, these papers only imply that higher levels of analytic thinking might be 
associated with vaccines endorsement. 
Minimal research on analytic thinking and vaccine endorsement.  
Indeed, only two papers cited above note analytic cognition’s possible role in the decision 
to vaccinate, touching on this system’s association with data-focus (as opposed to emotion-
focus) in the evaluation of claims and decision-making (Gupta, 2010; Poland & Poland, 2011). 
Overall, the papers cited above say little about the analytic mind at all, and mostly discuss 
heuristics and biases in reasoning. Perhaps the authors choose to focus on the inverse association 
of vaccine endorsement with the intuitive system because lower rates of endorsement are of more 
pressing interest than factors associated with higher endorsement of vaccines. It also is possible 
that these authors conceptualize dual process models as opposite ends of a single scale, rather 
than as separate systems (see Evans & Stanovich, 2013 for critisisms of this concpetualization), 
and so assume that since heuristics are associated with vaccine hesitancy, it simply goes without 
saying that analytic thinking would associate with endorsement. 
Although this seems a simple exercise in equating ‘like with like’, the literature supports 
this conjecture at least at the level of predictor and outcome-type: an analytic cognitive style has 
been positively associated not just with higher education level, but with an overall higher level of 
acceptance of scientifically founded beliefs, and concurrent lower levels of belief in 
pseudoscience; supernatural phenomena; the paranormal, and belief in conspiracy theories 
(Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; Browne, Pennycook, Goodwin, & McHenry, 2014; Genovese, 2005; 
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Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Gervais, 2015; Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 
2012; Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014). For instance, greater endorsement of 
evolution, a foundational scientific principle, along with rejection of creationism, was recently 
found by Gervais (2015) to be predicted by higher levels of analytical thinking, while Gervais 
and Norenzayan (2012), along with (Browne et al., 2014) observed higher scores on measures of 
analytical thinking associated with lower religiosity and spirituality. Further, Aarnio and 
Lindeman (2005) found that analytic thinking mediated a negative relationships between 
education level and belief in the paranormal among Finnish university students, while increases 
in analytical thinking were found associated with lowered propensity to believe conspiracy 
theories in Swami et al. (2014) – which presumably equates to a greater acceptance of more 
mainline, scientifically founded beliefs (see Kata, 2012 - more on conspiracy theories will 
follow).  
These results support the notion that higher levels of analytical thinking underlie higher 
likelihood of holding scientifically rooted beliefs, while lower analytic thinking is associated 
with higher likelihood of holding superstitious beliefs; beliefs in magic and the supernatural, and 
other beliefs, which “…have no epistemic warrant” according to science (Lobato, Mendoza, 
Sims, & Chin, 2014: abstract; see Subbotsky, 2014). It would seem logical, given these findings, 
that other beliefs distanced from scientific consensus, e.g. beliefs underlying a hesitancy to 
accept medical consensus on vaccine safety (discussion of such beliefs follows shortly), might 
inversely correlate with measures of analytic thinking style. 
The need for more direct, empirical studies of association 
To return to the link between heuristics and vaccine hesitancy noted in the literature, a 
methodological issue must be noted: in all of the papers reviewed, this relationship is only 
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suggested, and is not empirically measured. While these papers are by respected scholars, they 
tend to rely on informed conjecture rather than quantitative support. Further (and discouragingly 
for this study), the one paper located during the review that did conduct a direct test of 
association, using psychometrics for these variables, found no association at all (Browne, 
Thomson, Rockloff, & Pennycook, 2015). Certainly, this was unexpected. Given the papers 
reviewed above and their claims to having identified heuristic processing as highly present in the 
vaccine hesitant compared to endorsers – along with the implication that analytic thinking is 
related to endorsement – it would seem that detection of such an association would be likely.  
That said, Browne et al.’s methods could be criticized, as their operationalization of a 
dual-process model is perhaps too limited. The psychometric they use (Frederick, 2005) 
specifically measures intervention upon the intuitive system by the analytic system, via exposing 
subjects to mathematical story problems where a supposedly intuitive, heuristic answer is apt to 
spring to mind (which is contrary to the mathematical answer). The idea is that analytic thinkers 
tend to get it right, and intuitive thinkers tend to get it wrong. Now, while capacity toward 
analytic intervention upon intuition would logically give some indication of an individual’s 
general cognitive style, this criterion is perhaps too limited to truly test the person’s overarching 
cognitive style. Indeed, deployment of rational and intuitive cognitive systems in general covers 
a much larger realm of human life than understandings of numerical proportions and quantitative 
rates of change (this is the mathematical criteria in Frederick, 2005): these systems are deployed 
in memory, perception, attribution, and multitudes of other psychological domains; perhaps all of 
them (Epstein, 2014; Kahneman, 2011).  
In light of this criticism, and in light of the lack of conclusive, quantitative/empirical 
research on the relationship of heuristics and cognitive style to vaccine endorsement, a new study 
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was done, and is described in the remainder of this thesis (after a brief discussion on the nature 
of some beliefs underlying vaccine hesitancy is necessary). 
A brief caveat on conspiracy theories.  
While designing the study, colleagues noted that belief in conspiracy theories underlies 
much vaccine hesitancy. A review of the literature suggested that, indeed, both vaccine 
endorsement and cognitive style are associated with belief in conspiracy theories: belief in 
specific conspiracy theories is thought to compel individuals toward vaccine hesitancy (CDC, 
2006; Coady, 2006; Diethelm & McKee, 2009; Feldman-Savelsberg, Ndonko, & Schmidt-Ehry, 
2000; Jolley & Douglas, 2014; McConnachie & Tudge, 2013; Wilson, Larson, Chiu, & Schulz, 
2015), while specific heuristics and reasoning errors (e.g., the representativeness heuristic and 
confirmation bias reviewed in the earlier section) have been associated with acceptance of 
conspiracy theories and the assumptions which underlie them (Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 
2013; Brotherton & French, 2014; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007). Further, the heuristic role of fear 
and emotion in the acceptance of conspiracy theories is well-explored (Darwin, Neave, & 
Holmes, 2011; Jolley & Douglas, 2014; Leman, 2007). Regarding analytic thinking, 
experimentally induced increases in analytical thinking among test subjects have been associated 
with lowered levels of acceptance of conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2014). Given this 
truncated review (far more research on conspiracy theories was reviewed, and is omitted here for 
brevity), it was determined that a metric of belief in conspiracy theories should to be included in 
the study as a covariate. 
A final caveat: Demographics/politics.  
Though not of central interest here, age, education, sex, and parental status, as well as 
political orientation are all known to associate with vaccine endorsement/hesitancy in the 
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individual and parent (see Boom & Cunningham, 2014; Dubé et al., 2013 for reviews), and so 
measures for these parameters were also included in the study as covariates. Where possible, 
they were measured so as to be comparable to 2014 Census data.     
Study Rationale and Hypotheses 
Study rationale 
Theoretical links between cognitive style and vaccine endorsement found during the 
literature review suggested a direct association between cognitive style and vaccine endorsement 
might be detected in a national survey holding other relevant factors constant, and that this 
relationship might be bi-directional, with intuitive cognitive style associating negatively, and 
analytic cognitive style associating positively with vaccine endorsement.  
Hypotheses  
 In a national sample, analytic cognitive style will positively associate with vaccine 
endorsement, while intuitive cognitive style will negatively associate with vaccine endorsement. 
These relationships will be observed holding constant political and demographic covariates, 
along with beliefs in conspiracy theories. 
Methods  
Ethics Statement 
 The Institutional Review Board at Portland State University approved the study and all 
respondents gave informed consent.  
Participants and procedure 
 After aggregating questionnaires (see Materials section below) into a digital, online format 
using Qualtrics online software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT), a national US sample was accessed (N = 
603, age 18+) and the survey administered via Mechanical Turk (Amazon.com, Inc. Seattle, 
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WA). Mechanical Turk, or Mturk, is a paid online service where researchers can recruit and 
administer surveys to participants, as well as deliver compensation. Mechanical Turk’s 
participant pool has been validated in multiple papers as more representative of the US 
population than traditional participant pools accessed in mail and telephone surveys; comparable 
in response patterns to traditional pools and, finally, less expensive than other commercial online 
participant recruitment tools like surveymonkey.com (see Brandon, Long, Loraas, Mueller-
Phillips, & Vansant, 2013 for a review).  
 Piloting the survey, average completion time was 12 minutes 43 seconds. Cutoff for 
inclusion was set generously at 5 minutes, which excluded some respondents (n = 40). A few 
more were excluded for failing to provide completion codes on Mturk (n = 18), while two (n = 
2) had to be excluded for incomplete surveys. This left N = 543 out of the original N = 603 in the 
final dataset. All results were similar with or without these exclusions.  
 A note on demographic variables. Data were weighted so that the variable sex matched 
the 2014 census (females = 50.8%, males = 49.2%) because females were overrepresented in the 
sample by nearly n = 100, with males n = 223, females n = 320. Single variable weighting was 
performed by dividing the population-percentage of each sex by its percentage in the sample, and 
then multiplying each observation by the coefficient of its respondent’s sex. This resulted in 
males n = 267, females n = 276.  
Materials 
 Though all measurements were taken at the ordinal level, alpha values (α) were calculated 
to offer a suggestion of reliability per instrument. Future analysis could explore the use of 
alternative reliability assessments designed for use on ordinal data (see Gadermann, Guhn, & 
Zumbo, 2012).    
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Central measures: Vaccine endorsement and cognitive style 
 Vaccine endorsement. Kahan’s (2014) measure of affective orientation toward childhood 
vaccines (n = 21) was used to gauge level vaccine endorsement. This latent parameter is argued 
by its author to underlie individual risk/benefit perceptions of vaccines, level of support for 
universal immunization, and level of trust in the judgment of health officials/professionals. 
Crucially, this instrument is not specially tailored for use on parent samples, as were many 
measures of orientation toward vaccine encountered during the review. It therefore was deemed 
most appropriate for analysis of general endorsement of childhood vaccines in the adult 
population. Nineteen items from Kahan’s instrument were utilized, and two were excluded 
because they were related to perception of vaccine acceptance within the population rather than 
one’s personal orientation toward vaccines. This represented a single measure called vaccine 
endorsement here, which used 6-point and 8-point likert scales (α = .959). Example items include 
“I would have a negative view of parents who decided not to have their child receive generally 
recommended childhood vaccinations”, and “children who receive generally recommended 
childhood vaccinations have a higher risk of developing autism than children who are not 
vaccinated”. 
 Cognitive Style. Cognitive style was measured with a 10-item version of the Rational 
Experiential Inventory (REI-10) (Epstein et al., 1996), a two factor instrument gauging ‘faith in 
intuition’ (n = 5; α =.907) and ‘need for cognition’ (n = 5; α =.853), factors that purportedly 
gauge individuals’ overall engagement with dual processes of cognition in day-to-day thinking. 
Following Epstein (1994, 1996, 2014), here the overall consilience of dual-process models is 
taken to allow ‘need for cognition’ to stand in for ‘analytic cognitive style’, while ‘faith in 
intuition’ stands in for ‘intuitive cognitive style’.  
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 This instrument is a simplified version of its 40-item predecessor (REI-40), which is used 
in research noted throughout the literature review to measure cognitive style. It uses a 5-point 
Likert scale, asking respondents to rate their belief in the truth or falsity of statements such as “I 
prefer to do something that challenges my thinking abilities rather than something that requires 
little thought” (‘need for cognition’), and “I trust my initial feelings about people” (‘faith in 
intuition’) between 1 (completely false) and 5 (completely true).  
Covariates: Conspiracist beliefs and political orientation  
 Conspiracist belief. Brotherton, et al.'s (2013)’s 15-item Generic Conspiracist Beliefs 
Scale measures a cluster of assumptions people might make about how typical conspiracist 
activity is in the world: assumptions of global governmental malfeasance, extraterrestrial cover-
ups, personal wellbeing conspiracies (e.g., fluoride in drinking water is poisonous/vaccines are 
secretly threats to the personal wellbeing of the population), and control of information by 
powerful forces like governments and secret societies. These assumptions are taken to underlie 
acceptance of hosts of specific conspiracies in the individual (e.g., 9/11 attacks were part of 
secret governmental agendas; the Holocaust did not happen).  
 It is a propensity to hold such beliefs that is of interest here, rather than whatever specific 
conspiracies might be held by individuals, as it is this general factor that shows association with 
cognitive style, as well as the overall mistrust of the power structures of mainstream culture that 
arguably underlies much vaccine hesitancy (see Kata, 2010, 2012). The authors sum the 
conspiracist belief measure’s items into a single scale, as was done in the present study (α = 
.936). This instrument uses a 5-point Likert scale, and presents items such as “the power held by 
heads of state is second to that of small unknown groups who really control world politics”, and 
“groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or suppress evidence in order to deceive the public”.  
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  Political orientation. A single item measure of political orientation was included as 
well. This five-point measurement ranges from “1= very liberal” to “5= very conservative”. 
Despite being minimal in structure, it has shown high predictive/construct validity in 
experiments, predicting specific voting patterns with remarkable accuracy (Jost, 2006) and 
revealing neural correlates of political orientation (Kanai, Feilden, Firth, & Rees, 2011). While 
not of central interest here, recent research drawing on US government surveys suggests a 
significant link exists between conservative political identification and lower vaccine orientation 
(Lupton & Hare, 2015), so this variable was included here as a relevant covariate.  
Results 
Figures were generated and data cleaning performed using OS Numbers (Apple, 
Inc. Cupertino, CA) and IBM SPSS version 21.0 for Macintosh (IBM, Armonk, NY).  
Statistical analyses were also performed using SPSS. All data will be made available on 
the author’s website.  
Descriptive statistics 
After weighting the data, frequencies for demographic variables (sex, age range, parental 
status, level of education) were calculated and are shown in Tables 1-3 in Appendix A. 
Comparing level of education and age range to 2014 census data with chi-square goodness of fit 
tests, it was found that proportions per level of education in the sample were highly congruent 
with those in the 18 and over US population (χ2(14) = 439.3091, p < .001), while proportions per 
age range were not (χ2(11) = 4.298, p = .960), with younger individuals being overrepresented in 
the sample and the elderly barely being represented at all (see Table 2). This limitation was 
accepted and the analyses moved forward, as the sample showed higher diversity in this variable 
than might have been observed, for example, in most undergraduate samples.  
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 Preliminary analyses showed vaccine endorsement was highly positively skewed 
(see Figure 1), indicating a high rate of endorsement in the sample that concurs with 
earlier research, Min = 22, Max = 122, Mdn = 100, Q1 = 79, Q3 = 112. ‘Need for 
cognition’, Min = 5, Max = 25, Mdn = 19, Q1 = 15, Q3 = 19, and ‘faith in intuition’, Min 
= 5, Max = 25, Mdn = 19, Q1 = 16, Q3 = 19, showed somewhat less pronounced, but still 
long, left tails. Conspiracist belief was more normal, Min = 16, Max = 80, Mdn = 43, Q1 
= 32, Q3 = 52, while political orientation was skewed toward lower (more liberal) scores, 
Min = 1, Max = 5, Mdn = 3, Q1 = 2, Q3 = 3. These overall non-normal distributions, 
along with the ordinal level of measurement suggested using nonparametric tests to 
examine association between variables.         
 Chi square tests failed to detect statistically significant differences in scores of 
vaccine endorsement between sexes, χ2(82) = 92.581, p = .199, or between parental 
statuses, χ2(82) = 96.488, p = .131, however these categorical variables were associated 
with multiple study variables (see Tables 4-5 for results of tests of independence between 
parental-status/sex and study variables), and so they were included in the regression 
models discussed shortly.  
Validation of the affective orientation construct 
 After calculating descriptive statistics, positively and negatively valenced items 
from the vaccine endorsement instrument were summed separately into two variables and 
plotted in a scatterplot (see figure 2). Visual analysis confirms Kahan’s finding of a 
strong, negative association between risk and benefit assessments of vaccination, and 
suggests, by Kahan’s standards at least, a predominantly affective/heuristic approach to 
vaccine orientation throughout the population rather than a high amount of calculation of 
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risk/benefits. The scatterplot also concurs with the high level of vaccine endorsement in 
the population seen in Figure 1, with a large clustering of scores showing an overall 
positive opinion of childhood vaccines. A very strong and highly significant Pearson 
correlation coefficient confirmed the association, r = .872, p < .001. This finding will be 
returned to after testing the central hypotheses.  
Nonparametric correlations 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients were calculated between study variables and are 
shown in Table 6. Concurring with previous research on the REI, ‘need for cognition’ and ‘faith 
in intuition’ were not associated, rs = -.001, p = .975. In support of fundamental assumptions of 
dual process models, ‘need for cognition’ positively associated with level of education, rs = .109, 
p = .011, while ‘faith in intuition’ showed a negative association there rs = -.200, p < .001. 
Offering mixed support for research reviewed, conspiracist belief showed a positive association 
with ‘faith in intuition’ rs = .205, p < .001, but no association with ‘need for cognition’, rs = -
.080, p = .064. 
In support of the hypothesis, ‘need for cognition’ showed a weak but significant 
association with vaccine endorsement at rs = .154, p < .001, while, contrary to the hypothesis, 
‘faith in intuition’ showed no association there, rs = -.026, p = .552. Vaccine endorsement 
showed a moderate, negative associations with conspiracist belief, rs = -.486, p < .001, and a 
weak positive association with level of education, rs = .110, p < .001. Political orientation and 
vaccine endorsement were negatively associated, rs = -.307, p < .001, indicating lower levels of 
vaccine endorsement among more conservative respondents, and higher scores on vaccine 
endorsement among the more liberal. This is in line with recent research noted in the Measures 
section. Liberalness was associated with higher ‘need for cognition’, and conservativeness with 
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cognition’, rs -.132, p = .001, while ‘faith in intuition’ did not associate with political orientation 
rs = .079, p = .065.  
 Aside from these notable associations, an overall high level of shared association among 
variables was observed (see Table 6). For example, education level showed weak but significant 
associations with nearly all variables. This suggested entering all variables into an explanatory 
model to suggest at what degree cognitive style contributes to vaccine endorsement holding all 
other variables constant.  
Ordinal regression analyses  
Recoding and tests of assumptions. The variables vaccine endorsement, ‘need for 
cognition’, and ‘faith in intuition’ were recoded into high, medium, and low score groups at their 
33rd percentiles. This was done both to ease presentation of results shown in figures and because 
results from all models using the raw data failed to meet the assumption of proportional odds 
required to perform ordinal regression (with p’s < .05 in testing a null hypothesis of proportional 
odds). That is, ordinal regression assumes the ability to predict values of the dependent variable 
with equal odds at any level of the independent variable. This assumption was met after recoding 
the variables into the three-tier groups, p’s > .05. This result held across all models tested. Tests 
on the final model also showed that despite shared associations throughout the data, 
multicollinearity was not an issue (Tolerances, .816 to .976, VIFs, 1.228 to 2.286).  
Ordinal regression models. In the first model (all models are shown in Table 7), ‘need 
for cognition’ was tested singularly. It significantly predicted higher odds of vaccine 
endorsement at an odds ratio of 1.473 (95% CI, 1.218 to 1.782), Wald χ2(1) = 15.984, p < .001, 
(see Figure 3 in Appendix B). Adding ‘faith in intuition’ to the model with ‘need for cognition’ 
(model 2, Table 7), ‘need for cognition’ continued to associate similarly at an odds ratio of 1.475 
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(95% CI, 1.220 to 1.784), Wald χ2(1) = 16.076, p < .001, while ‘faith in intuition’ failed to 
associate with higher or lower odds of vaccine endorsement, at an odds ratio of 0.954 (95% CI, 
0.795 to 1.146), Wald χ2(1) = 0.250, p  = .617. Likewise, due to its showing no correlation with 
vaccine endorsement, ‘faith in intuition’ was not entered into a model as a single predictor. 
Entering conspiracist belief into the model (model 3), it was found to be a significant 
predictor of lower odds of vaccine endorsement at an odds ratio of 0.931 (95% CI, .919 to .944), 
Wald χ2(1) = 105.886, p < .001, while ‘need for cognition’ continued to significantly and 
positively predict vaccine endorsement at an odds ratio of 1.401 (95% CI, 1.148 to 1.709), Wald 
χ2(1) = 11.010, p = .001. Contrary to all expectations, this model showed ‘faith in intuition’ 
associating positively with vaccine endorsement: higher ‘faith in intuition’ scores were 
associated with higher odds of increased scores on vaccine endorsement at an odds ratio of 1.226 
(95% CI, 1.007 to 1.492), Wald χ2(1) = 4.123, p = .042, once conspiracist belief was entered into 
the model. These results suggest that, controlling for conspiracist beliefs, ‘faith in intuition’ and 
‘need for cognition’ are each independent, positive, and significant predictors of vaccine 
endorsement.  
 Model 4 included only demographics and political orientation as predictors. There, 
political orientation, and education emerged as significant predictors of vaccine endorsement, 
with lower (more liberal) political orientation predicting higher vaccine endorsement, at an odds 
ratio of .625 (95% CI, .540 to .724), Wald χ2(1) = 39.129, p < .001, and higher level of education 
predicting higher vaccine endorsement at an odds ratio of 1.096 (95% CI, 1.008 to 1.912), Wald 
χ2(1) = 4.573, p = .032. Adding cognitive style variables to the model (model 5), higher scores 
on ‘need for cognition’ predicted higher scores on vaccine endorsement as hypothesized, at an 
odds ratio of 1.365 (95% CI, 1.124 to 1.658), Wald χ2(1) = 9.837, p = .002. Lower (more liberal) 
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scores on political orientation again predicted higher scores on vaccine orientation, at an odds 
ratio of .637 (95% CI, .549 to .739), Wald χ2(1) = 35.479, p < .001. Following results of the 
earlier model, ‘faith in intuition’ did not emerge as a predictor, 1.070 (95% CI, .879 to 1.301), 
Wald χ2(1) = .453, p = .501, and neither did level of education, 1.09 (95% CI, 1.000 to 1.187), 
Wald χ2(1) = 3.844, p = .050, though it was at the threshold of significance at 95% confidence.   
Adding it to the final model (model 6), conspiracist belief emerged as a significant, 
negative predictor of vaccine endorsement at an odds ratio of .928 (95% CI, .914 to .941), Wald 
χ2(1) = 104.260, p < .001. As was the case in the earlier models, ‘faith in intuition’ emerged as a 
significant, positive predictor of vaccine endorsement upon the inclusion of conspiracist beliefs 
into the model, at an odds ratio of 1.331 (95% CI, 1.076 to 1.647), Wald χ2(1) = 6.964, p = .008, 
while ‘need for cognition’ was also a significant, positive predictor of vaccine endorsement in 
this model, at an odds ratio of 1.336 (95% CI, 1.089 to 1.634), Wald χ2(1) = 7.711, p = .005. 
Political orientation continued to negatively predict vaccine endorsement, as was the case in all 
models, with lower, more liberal scores predicting higher vaccine endorsement and higher, more 
conservative scores predicting lower vaccine orientation, at an odds ratio of .610 (95% CI, .522 
to .713), Wald χ2(1) = 38.336, p < .001. 
Additional analyses. Finally, the correlational analyses between positively and 
negatively valenced items done both in Kahan (2014) and in the present thesis were repeated for 
each of the ‘need for cognition’ and ‘faith in intuition’ score subgroups (low, medium, high). 
Though not central to the hypotheses and so not in the main body of the forthcoming discussion, 
results from these analyses are essential in clarifying this paper’s conclusions, and so are 
returned to in the final section.  
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Associations between positively and negatively valenced items were strong4 (r  < -.50), 
for each sub-group. In ‘need for cognition’ score subgroups, coefficients increased sequentially 
per score subgroup at relatively small levels of effect (low: r = -.759, p < .001; medium: r = -
.859, p < .001; high: r = -.931, p < .001). Among ‘faith in intuition’ score subgroups, the medium 
and high score subgroups showed similar coefficients (medium: r = -.838, p < .001; high: r = -
.857, p < .001), while the low score subgroup showed a stronger relationship, r = -.919, p < 001. 
This variation is minimal, as no sub-group departed from the pattern within score subgroups of 
strong Pearson r coefficients.  
Discussion 
Summary 
The hypotheses received partial support. Holding covariates constant in several 
regression models, ‘need for cognition’ did positively predict vaccine endorsement in a national 
sample, while intuitive thinking, unexpectedly, also positively predicted vaccine endorsement in 
several regression models, but only upon inclusion of a conspiracist belief measure.  
Unexpected, inconclusive results  
A negative association between intuitive cognitive style and vaccine endorsement had 
been hypothesized based on a suggestion in the literature that heuristics underlie vaccine-hesitant 
decisions. Why might the data have deviated so completely from this expectation? Two 
possibilities are suggested here. One considers a possible error in selection of measurements: 
Kahan’s (2014) instrument is, again, conceptualized as measuring level of affective, rather than 
intellectual orientation toward vaccines. What the author of the present thesis did not consider is 
that a general tendency to rely on intuitive judgments, i.e. ‘faith in intuition’ (which is considered 
                                                
4 See Rubin, 2012 for classification of weak, moderate, and strong Pearson r coefficients.  
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highly congruent with affect in dual process models [Epstein, 1994]), might positively associate 
in the direction of data-skew with any measure of affective orientation once other co-associated 
predictor variables (here, conspiracist beliefs) are held constant. This no doubt speculative, yet 
colleagues more experienced in ordinal regression analysis suggested this is plausible, and that 
state of the art statistical tests should examine this possibility in future work.  
It is also possible that, simply, most Americans’ intuitive reaction toward vaccines is 
trust, and so higher use of intuition in day-to-day life is associated with higher vaccine 
endorsement (but, this association has is not visible without controlling for specific confounds). 
This would certainly follow Kahan’s (2014) and Ritvo et al.'s (2003) conclusions (discussed 
earlier), and would concur with the general skew toward endorsement in the data.  
For clarification, this positive skew indicates that the general public’s intuitions concur 
with the highly complex biomedical and epidemiological concepts underlying both the biological 
workings-of, and rationale-behind, vaccine-recommendations of doctors and public health 
officials. Since most people do not have the time to learn the ins-and-outs of these complex 
concepts, they therefore might actually hold an irrational ‘faith in science’ (see Farias, 
Newheiser, Kahane, & de Toledo, 2013) independent of whatever analytical understanding of 
these scientific/medical concepts. This would concur with Slovic et al. (2005), that 
 …[u]sing an overall, readily available affective impression can be easier and 
more efficient than weighing the pros and cons of various reasons or retrieving relevant 
examples from memory, especially when the required judgment or decision is complex or 
mental resources are limited (p. S36), 
It would also explain, perhaps, why vaccine endorsement in the US is so high in the first place. 
Further tests on both the present data and from new studies should look into this.    
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However plausible and logical these explanations might be, until more tests can be 
performed, intuitive cognitive style’s directional relation to vaccine endorsement remains veiled 
in theoretical and statistical questions. What are the details of interaction effects between ‘faith 
in intuition’ and conspiracist beliefs upon vaccine endorsement? Is it an artifact in the present 
sample’s data? How should researchers understand the influence of an overall preference toward 
use of intuition upon personality traits that are themselves founded in intuitions? Such questions 
must be approached in future research. Until then, present results cannot be taken to support the 
hypothesis, let alone suggest the plausibility of claims in the literature that an association exists 
between vaccine hesitancy and the use of heuristics (it does not refute them, either). 
Implications: Cognitive style, vaccine endorsement, and affectively held scientific beliefs 
Conclusively, however, results do suggest that analytic thinking predicts vaccine 
endorsement in the US (see Figure 3), both singularly and holding constant demographic, 
political, and related psychological variables. This finding is not surprising: it is certainly in line 
with research linking a willingness and ability to think analytically with higher likelihood of 
acceptance of mainstream scientific ideas, such as the theory of evolution (see Gervais, 2015), 
while linking low willingness/ability to think analytically with belief in the paranormal, 
religious, and other nonscientific beliefs (Browne et al., 2014; Pennycook et al., 2012). That is, 
given the scientific/biomedical foundations of biomedicine’s claims to efficacy, we would 
expect, looking at the constructs, that acceptance of vaccines would correlate with other traits 
known to correlate with scientifically founded beliefs.  
However, this is certainly not a satisfactory explanation, as it simply equates like-with-
like at the level of the concept/stereotype. To look deeper: studies on science learning and 
developmental psychology have long noted that complex scientific concepts and processes (e.g., 
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evolution; gravity) are immensely difficult to grasp even on the rudimentary level, especially 
compared to everyday concepts (e.g., animal, artifact, natural object), which even very young 
children seem to grasp with minimal explanation (Chi, Slotta, & de Leeuw, 1994; Gelman & 
Wellman, 1991). Unlike these ‘natural’ mental concepts, comprehension of complex scientific 
concepts (e.g., the animal’s cellular complexity) is contingent upon sustained effort on the part of 
the student, and on their ability to override natural intuitions about the world (Chi et al., 1994; 
Sweller, 1994). All this might imply that the greater one’s capacity is to expend analytic mental 
effort, the more one is likely to grapple with complex scientific concepts. Such gains in 
familiarity and fluency in complex scientific concepts might, in the long run (at least) nudge 
one’s preferences toward concurrence with the mainstream model of science and medicine, just 
as it might (at best) engender real expert understanding of scientific topics.  
The positive relationship between analytic thinking and vaccine endorsement observed 
here does not imply that higher capacity to think analytically necessarily leads to greater 
objective understandings of medicine, immunology, and epidemiology (scientific concepts 
underlying public vaccination programs). Rather, it implies that for those who’s analytic thinking 
style has led to greater familiarity and fluency with the scientific/medical paradigm, ‘truths’ 
inferred about reality are all the more likely to concur with the recommendations of science and 
medicine (e.g., truths like ‘vaccines are a good thing’). Conversely, one with a less analytic 
cognitive style might be less familiar with such ideas, as they are less likely to spend time in 
scientific situations, and therefore might be less likely to come to science-based conclusions.  
The data seem to bear these conclusions out in an interesting way: in all cognitive style 
score subgroups (high, medium, and low cognitive style rankings), negatively and positively 
valenced vaccine endorsement items associated strongly and negatively (r < -.50), indicating 
ANALYTIC THINKING PREDICTS VACCINE ENDORSEMENT  29 
strongly-affectively (rather than intellectually)-driven decision making regarding vaccines in the 
sample, even among those with high scores on analytic cognitive style. Among the low, medium, 
and high ‘need for cognition’ score subgroups, strength of association increased subsequently per 
increase in group-rank, suggesting that people with a more analytical cognitive style actually 
tended to orient toward vaccines more affectively than those with a less analytic cognitive style 
(although these differences were small, despite being statistically significant5). This suggests that 
having a high score on analytic thinking might actually be associated with relatively higher use 
of affect in coming to vaccine decisions than is the case for a relatively lower score, although 
again associations for both these score subgroups are strong, as they are in all score subgroups6. 
This too might suggest that despite analytical cognitive style being associated with higher 
levels of vaccine endorsement, higher levels of analytic thinking are not necessarily associated 
with higher likelihood of arriving at vaccine decisions through analytic reasoning. Indeed, results 
here might suggest that higher vaccine endorsement is more related to a scientific cultural 
worldview that is influenced by scientific consensuses rather than evaluations of individual data, 
                                                
5  For instance, ‘low’ ‘‘need for cognition’; score subgroup: r = -.759, p < .001; ‘high’ ‘need for 
cognition’ score-group: r = -.931, p < .001. A one-tailed test after a Fisher’s r-to-z transformation 
shows this difference is significant, z = 6.37, p < .001, while both coefficients are strong. 
6 As for intuitive thinking, while it is interesting that the lowest score sub-group showed the 
strongest association, and thus the highest level of affective reasoning (r = -.919, p < 001), all 
three associations there were strong and variation was minimal (see Results section), indicating 
high levels of affective decision making in all three score subgroups, rather than higher scores on 
‘faith in intuition’ being associated with a more affective orientation, as would be expected in 
light of the hypothesis.   
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and which can be intensified through specialized learning (i.e., science education), especially 
when one possesses the mental capacity (‘need for cognition’) to at least partially accept, if not 
understand, the complex principles and concepts that underlie such conclusions. 
The role of science education and cultures 
The role of culture and society is crucial in this conjecture. Indeed, the norms of a 
person’s home, society, and culture can influence whether they focus on science at all, no matter 
what their psychological dispositions. How people come to believe, perceive, and act as they do, 
at least in ethnographic and psychological literature, is often explained as being derived from the 
‘truths’ that are talked about as real among their groups in day-to-day life (Boyer, 1990; 
Luhrmann, 1991; Sobo, 2015; see Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015). Whatever mechanisms are actually 
at work in the transmission of cultural norms7, they undoubtedly represent base-influences on 
individual beliefs (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015), be these beliefs about the existence of god/spirits; 
right versus wrong, or the efficacy and validity of medical science. Indeed, social norms are 
continually implicated in the literature as the major determinant of vaccine attitudes and 
decisions (Browne et al., 2015; Sobo, Huhn, Sannwald, & Thurman, 2016; Sobo, 2015). The 
high level of vaccine endorsement observed in the present sample (which, crucially, is present 
despite the fact that epidemiological and biomedical concepts are incredibly hard to grasp) might 
suggest that individuals in mainstream culture internalize the medical ‘truths’ they encounter just 
as they do other social norms, and probably employ them without much conscious inspection, 
irrespective of whether they have a more intuitive or analytic personality. Obviously, the same 
would be true of groups where non-mainstream beliefs about health and medicine dominate.  
                                                
7 See Boyer, 1990 for a detailed discussion on the plausibility of various proposed mechanisms 
cultural transmission. 
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Conclusion 
Widespread consensus on the safety and necessity of childhood vaccination exists in the 
U.S. (Kahan, 2014). This is the case despite the fact that most people probably do not understand 
the complex biomedical and epidemiological concepts that underlie public vaccination programs 
(see Ritvo et al., 2003). Rather, people likely internalize mainstream medical sentiment as they 
do other cultural norms: intuitively; automatically, and apart from a large amount of conscious 
inspection (Boyer, 1990). For some people, the capacity to think scientifically (analytic thinking) 
might lead to possessing a greater volume of declarative knowledge about vaccine science. 
However, the present thesis suggests that while analytic thinking does predict vaccine 
endorsement in the population, endorsement remains the result of an affective appraisal even 
among those with higher levels of analytic thinking, suggesting that greater vaccine endorsement 
in this case might arise from a feeling of familiarity and fluency toward science in general among 
individuals with a higher propensity toward analytic thinking. A positive relationship between 
intuitive thinking and vaccine endorsement observed in regression models holding constant 
belief in conspiracies seems to confirm this as well, while at the same time contradicting some 
claims about the relation of intuitive thinking to vaccine hesitancy. However, lack of statistical 
clarity there means that specific conclusions on this association must be withheld for now.  
Future directions 
 Results suggest multiple paths for future research. To begin, repeating this study on both 
national and cross-cultural samples would test the validity of its conclusions. Future studies 
might seek out high-and-low vaccine endorsers on both the individual and group level, and might 
employ psychometrics that better facilitate the testing of hypothesis. For instance, similar studies 
could be conducted comparing parents of Waldorf (Steiner) School students (who are known to 
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medical anthropologists to have comparatively low rates of vaccine endorsement [Sobo, 2015]) 
with parents of students in traditional education. Studies might also compare the parameters 
estimated here between students of the natural sciences versus those in other programs.  
As for methodological directions, future studies might compare high and low level 
vaccine endorsers’ use of the exact heuristics noted in the literature review as associated with 
vaccine hesitancy — an idea that was discarded in designing the present study in favor of direct 
self-reports of intuitive thinking. As is well known to researchers, self-reports can be skewed by 
any number of factors in the respondent, such as their answering in a way they perceive as being 
socially desirable (Furnham, 1986), and so this is potentially a problem here. If this association 
of heuristics and vaccine hesitancy were observed, it would suggest an inverse association 
between intuitive cognitive style and vaccine endorsement does exist despite that opposite 
relationships were detected here. Longitudinal designs might also provide a level of validity to 
conclusions not available through survey research, as use and engagement of both intuitive and 
analytical cognitive systems changes throughout the lifespan (Epstein, 2014), and age positively 
predicted vaccine endorsement in the present survey rs = .110, p < .001. Lastly, use of 
experimental rather than survey data should be pursued in later work, as regression analysis is 
increasingly being criticized by scientists for its high likelihood of disconnect between study 
constructs and population parameters (see Freedman, Collier, & Sekhon, 2010).   
Limitations 
 Multiple limitations were accepted in undertaking this study. First, while Mturk is widely 
used in academia for survey research, more stringent, or at least more varied sampling methods 
in future studies would likely increase the validity and generalizability of results. Budgetary 
constraints were also a factor, and prevented administering the original battery of measurements 
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compiled for the research. For instance, the 40-item Core Knowledge Confusion measurement 
(Lindeman et al., 2008), an arguably more subtle measure of intuitive cognitive style, was 
omitted from the battery due to budgetary constraints on survey length. Finally, sample 
weighting according to the Census was not possible because the author had not been trained in 
this complex undertaking at the time of analysis (fortunately, weighting for a single variable, as 
was done here, is not complex and easily performed with SPSS). As noted earlier, this does not 
invalidate the sample, but population parameters could be inferred with greater confidence if it 
had been weighted in a more sophisticated fashion. Finally, certain statistical procedures were 
not used here due to the author not having the necessary expertise. Such methods might have 
revealed additional insights. For instance (and as noted), no interactions between independent 
variables were entered into the regression models here because the author had not been trained in 
this advanced procedure.  
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Appendix A: Tables 
Education Level % Census 18+ % Survey
None 0.4 0
1st - 4th grade 0.7 0
5th - 6th grade 1.4 0
7th - 8th grade 1.8 0.4
9th grade 1.6 0
10th grade 2.0 0
11th grade 4.4 0.5
High school 
graduate
29.6 12.5
Some college no 
degree
19.4 25.5
Associate's 
degree, 
occupational
4.1 3.1
Associate's 
degree, 
academic
5.3 5.4
Bachelor's 
degree
18.9 39.9
Master's degree 7.5 10.0
Professional 
degree
1.3 0.8
Doctoral degree 1.6 1.8
Note. A Chi Square Goodness of Fit test revealed observed 
proportions in the sample were highly similar to proportions 
in the 2014 US census, χ2(14) = 439.3091, p < .001. 
Groups with a value of zero were entered as .000000001 to 
avoid ‘division by zero’ errors.   
Table 1
Education-Level Group Proportions for 
Census and Sample Data 
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Age Range % Census 18+ % Survey
18 to 24 years 12.6 12.6
25 to 29 years 9.0 20.2
30 to 34 years 8.8 18.5
35 to 39 years 8.1 15.4
40 to 44 years 8.5 10.1
45 to 49 years 8.6 4.9
50 to 54 years 9.3 7.8
55 to 59 years 8.8 3.8
60 to 64 years 7.7 4.0
65 to 69 years 6.2 1.8
70 to 74 years 4.5 0.8
75 years and over 7.8 0.2
Note. A Chi Square Goodness of Fit test revealed 
observed proportions in the sample were highly dissimilar 
to proportions in the 2014 US census, (χ2(11) = 4.298, p = 
.960)
Table 2
Age-Range Group Proportions for Census 
and Sample Data 
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Sex Frequency % Parental Status Frequency %
Male 267 49.2 Parent 228 41.9
Female 276 50.8 Non-Parent 315 58.1
Total 543 100.0 Total 543 100.0
Table 3
Age-Range and Parental Status Proportions
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Measure  χ2 df p
Psychological NFC 22.041 20 0.338
FI 31.579 18 0.025
Conspiracy Theories CONS 54.055 60 0.692
Political PO 17.383 4 0.002
Demographic AGE 80.155 11 < .001
EDUC 18.072 9 0.034
SEX 19.878 1 < .001
Note. NFC = need for cognition; FI = faith in intuition; 
CONS  = conspiracist beliefs; PO = political orientation 
(1 = very liberal, 5 = very conservative); EDUC = level of 
education;; SEX = sex (0 = male, 1 = female).
Table 4
Tests for Independence Between Study 
Variables and Parental Status
ANALYTIC THINKING PREDICTS VACCINE ENDORSEMENT !51
Appendix A: Tables  
Measure  χ2 df p
Psychological NFC 14.510 20 0.804
FI 40.827 18 0.002
Conspiracy Theories CONS 61.120 60 0.435
Political PO 5.334 4 0.255
Demographic AGE 10.759 11 0.464
EDUC 3.113 9 0.960
PAR 19.878 1 < .001
Note. NFC = need for cognition; FI = faith in intuition; 
CONS  = conspiracist beliefs; PO = political orientation 
(1 = very liberal, 5 = very conservative); EDUC = level of 
education; PAR = parental status (0 = non-parent, 1 = 
parent).
Table 5
Tests for Independence Between Study 
Variables and Sex
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Table 6
Measures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1.  NFC — -0.001 .154** -0.080 0.012 .109* -.135**
2.  FI -0.001 — -0.026 .205** 0.004 -.200** 0.079
3.  VE .154** -0.026 — -.486** -0.040 .110** -.307**
4.  CONS -0.080 .205** -.486** — -0.007 -.269** 0.078
5.  AGE 0.012 0.004 -0.040 -0.007 — .092* 0.082
6.  EDU .109* -.200** .110** -.269** .092* — -0.044
7.  PO -.135** 0.079 -.307** 0.078 0.082 -0.044 —
Note. NFC = need for cognition; FI = faith in intuition; VE = vaccine orientation; CONS  = conspiracist beliefs; AGE = age; EDUC = level of 
education; PO = political orientation (1 = very liberal, 5 = very conservative).
* p < .05
** p < .001
Intercorrelations for Ordinal Measures 
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Table 7
Model
1 2 3 4 5 6
Measures OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Psychological NFC 1.473 1.218,1.782 1.475 1.220, 1.784 1.401 1.148,1.709 1.365 1.124,1.658 1.336 1.089,1.640
FI 0.945 0.795,1.146 1.226 1.007,1.492 1.070 0.879,1.301 1.331 1.076, 1.646
Conspiracy 
Theories CONS
0.931 0.919,0.944 0.928 0.914,0.941
Political PO 0.625 0.540,0.724 0.637 0.549,0.739 0.610 0.522,0.713
Demographic AGE 0.973 0.908,1.042 0.972 0.907,1.042 0.977 0.908,1.051
EDUC 1.096 1.008,1.192 1.090 1.000,1.187 0.978 0.892,1.074
PAR 1.090 0.768,1.545 1.135 0.798,1.616 1.209 0.834,1.752
SEX 1.175 0.846,1.632 1.161 0.830,1.625 1.233 0.865,1.757
Note. OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval; NFC = need for cognition; FI = faith in intuition; CONS  = conspiracist beliefs; PO = political orientation (1 = very 
liberal, 5 = very conservative); EDUC = level of education; PAR = parental status (0 = non-parent, 1 = parent); SEX = sex (0 = male, 1 = female).
p-values < .05 shown in bold.
Ordinal Regression Models Predicting Vaccine Endorsement 
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Appendix B: Figures 
Figure 1. Frequency distributions of Vaccine Endorsement scores.
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Figure 2. Plotting summed negatively and positively valenced vaccine 
endorsement items (r = .872, p < .001)  
Positively Valenced Vaccine Endorsement Items
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Figure 3. Analytic thinking predicts vaccine endorsement
